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Abstract: Prior to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, securitization has been widely 
perceived as a way to disperse credit risks, and to enhance financial system’s capacity in 
dealing with defaults. This paper develops a model of securitization and financial stability in 
the form of amplification effects. This model has illustrated three different scenarios: A 
negative shock in the economy will lead to downturn of the economy and falling of the asset 
prices, deteriorating balance sheets and tightening financing conditions. However, if there is 
no shock or a positive shock, banks can improve its profitability significantly through 
securitization. While securitization decreases the probability of systemic crisis, banks tend to 
suffer more when the crisis happens as a result of over-borrowing and over-investing. This 
paper uses a three-period theoretical model to demonstrate the impact of securitization on the 
financial stability, and provides clear analytical guidelines for a new regulatory framework of 
securitization that account for systemic risk and systemic externalities. 
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Asset Price, Asset Securitization and Financial Stability 
1 Introduction 
The financial crisis started in the US in 2007 quickly spread out to all developed and 
emerging economy, and is considered as the most serious crises since the Great Depression. 
Its global effects include the failure and bailout of key financial institutions, the decline in 
private wealth, substantial financial commitments incurred by many governments, and a 
significant decline in economic activities. This crisis raised the need for the researchers and 
policymakers around the globe to take unprecedented policy measures to deal with systemic 
risks (Gorton 2008, Brunnermeier 2009, Diamond and Rajan 2009, Blanchard 2009 and 
Krishnamurthy 2009). There is no coherent definition for systemic risk, but most existing 
research considers it as the danger or probability that financial institutions become insolvent 
in a large scale. This concept is different from so-called ―systematic risk’ which sometimes 
called market risk, aggregate risk, or undiversifiable risk, is the risk associated with aggregate 
market returns.  
Comparing to the crisis in the 20
th century, the recent crisis has three main features. Firstly, 
the immediate cause or trigger of the crisis is neither the bankruptcy of traditional banks nor 
currency crisis in the traditional sense, but the burst of the United States housing bubble 
which peaked in approximately 2005–2006. Secondly, the asset lead to crisis is not the long 
term investment project as before, but the mortgage-backed security (MBS). Thirdly, in order 
to keep liquidity, the financial institutions made panic selling of securities, which sharpened 
the severity of the crisis. 
 
The fore-mentioned features of the crisis are associated with the operating model of the 
modern banking. Traditionally, the main source of bank’s revenue is interest on the capital it 
lends out to customers. And the bank profits from the difference between lending and deposit 
interest, as shown in figure 1. 
Under the traditional banking model, the arrival of some negative information on banks' 
investment returns may lead to severe bank runs. There is a large range of research related to 
this issue. For example, Corrado(2005) analyse how a supranational institution which acts as 
an international lender of last resort can cope with banking crises by guaranteeing run-proof 
bank deposit contracts in the traditional banking crisis. 
In the past decades, banks, especially American banks, have adopted different measures to 
remain profitable in a rapidly changing financial system. One popular measure adopted by 
large modern banks is to participate in financial markets by originating and distributing 
securities as well as operating in the monetary market. Originally, the securitization market 
served as a source of financing and many assumed that securitization would provide a more 
resilient source of financing compared with the conventional market that depends on 
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borrowing from other financial intermediaries. Figure 2 shows the structure of the securitized 
banking system. 
 
Through securitization, banks can increase their leverages. Securitization can offer perfect 
matched funding by eliminating funding exposure in terms of both duration and pricing basis. 
Apart from these advantages, the securitization can also help banks to reduce capital 
requirements, lock in profits, and transfer risks. Given those benefits, it is not surprising that 
securitization has grown rapidly in banking industry. As shown in Figure 3, private bond 
issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities (RMBS and CMBS), 
asset-backed securities (ABS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) peaked in 2006 to 
nearly $2 trillion. In 2009, private issuance dropped to less than $150 billion, and almost all 
of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF (Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility) program to aid credit card and small-business lenders.  
 
 
Figure 3: Securitization market in U.S ($ billions) 
 
Does securitization lead to the financial stability? It is difficult to answer this question 
without formally modelling the underlying externalities associated with systemic financial 
crises. This paper attempts to model the impact of asset securitization on financial systemic 
risk. We measure the likelihood of a crisis by the probability that a bank liquids all its asset, 
and its scale (impact) in terms of the asset price. Lower asset prices correspond to more 
serious crises. 
 
Leverage is another important factor to consider on the financial stability and securitization is 
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crucial in understanding the leverage of the financial system as a whole. Securitization 
enables credit expansion through higher leverage of the financial system as a whole. If the 
expansion of assets entailed by the growth in financial system leverage drives down lending 
standards, securitization may decrease financial stability rather than promoting it. 
Figure 4 plots the leverage US primary dealers: First, leverage tends to decrease overall since 
1986. This decline in leverage is due to the bank holding companies in the sample—a sample 
consisting only of investment banks shows no such trend in leverage (see Adrian and Shin, 
2007). Secondly, each of the peaks in leverage was immediately followed by a financial crisis 
(the peaks are 1987Q2, 1998Q3, 2008Q3). Financial crisis tend to follow marked increases of 
leverage. 
 
Source: SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings, sited in ―Leverage, Securitization and Global Imbalances‖ 
Note: the set of 18 banks that has a daily trading relationship with the Fed. They consist of US investment banks and US 
bank holding companies with large broker subsidiaries (such as Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase) 
Figure 4: Mean Leverage of US Primary Dealers 
 
More research is needed on the links between bank leverage and the securitization. In our 
model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade asset good, or they hold consume good. 
They also borrow capital good, using their security holdings as collateral, which will form 
different leverages. And we then examine the relationship between security, leverage and 
financial stability.  
 
Our model predicts that asset securitization makes crises less likely since banks have more 
consume good to keep liquid by asset securitization. As a result, direct lenders are more 
willing to lend, allowing banks to increase their borrowing and initial investment. But, if a 
crisis does occur, losses will be greater. Overall, asset securitization may serve as a measure 
to reduce the likelihood of crises but to magnify their potential impact. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 sets up the 
benchmark model. Section 4 shows the model with securitization. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. The Appendix contains all the proofs. 
2 Related Literature 
Our paper is related to three broad strands of research:  asset prices and financial stability, 
asset securitization and financial stability, financial leverage and financial stability. We 5 
 
attempt to combine these three strands by describing banks’ choices of securitization and 
financial leverage as well as the impact on financial stability. 
2.1 Asset prices and financial stability 
The idea that the asset price influences on financial constraint and financial stability can be 
traced back at least as far as Veblen (1904, chap. 5), who described the positive interactions 
between asset prices and collateralized borrowing. Later, many researchers followed his idea 
and built up a large body of literature in this area.  Bernanke and Gertler (1989), for example, 
construct an overlapping generation model in which financial market imperfections cause 
temporary shocks in net worth, and such shocks are to be amplified and to persist. In their 
model, a positive technology shock increases the labour demanded by the entrepreneurs who 
have been funded, and allows for more projects to be undertaken. Moreover, the 
accompanying rise in wage improves the financial position of the next generation of 
entrepreneurs, so more of their projects will be funded. They will subsequently demand more 
labour, and the cycle goes on. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) extend the Bernanke and Gertler’s 
story by illustrating the positive feedback through asset prices and the associated 
intertemporal multiplier process. During a business cycle, a major channel for shocks to net 
worth is through changes in the values of firms’ assets or liabilities. Asset prices reflect future 
market conditions. When the effects of a shock persist (as in Bernanke and Gertler 1989), the 
cumulative impact on asset prices, and hence on net worth at the time of the shock, can be 
significant. They show that small, temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can 
generate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices.  
 
Similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008) studies the welfare properties of 
competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In 
particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex 
ante and excessive volatility ex post. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive 
policies, which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial 
crisis. Existing studies allow for state-contingent financial contracts. However it is unclear to 
what extent the underlying externality drives their results. In contrast, our model compares 
the difference of the over borrowing rate with or without securitization between the actual 
financial contract and the state-contingent financial contracts which is clearer. Qiu(2011) 
build a general equilibrium model to analyze how the ability of banks to create money can 
affect asset prices and financial stability. His research focuses on the monetary policy while 
our research puts more attention to the relationship between asset price and asset 
securitization. 
 
2.2 Asset securitization and financial stability 
Traditional theories of financial intermediation describe banks as accepting deposits, 
primarily from households, and issuing loans, primarily to firms (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Diamond, 1984). The involvement of banks in security markets requires a revision of this 
theory. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and Allen and Gale (1997) are pioneers in modeling 
bank’s operation in financial markets. There is now substantial evidence which suggests that 
securitization, the act of converting illiquid loans into liquid securities, contributed to bad 
loans. (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Mian and Sufi,2008; Purnanandam,2008; Keys et al.,2009). 
By creating distance between the originators of loans and the investors who bear the final risk 6 
 
of default, securitization weakened lenders’ incentives to screen borrowers, exacerbating the 
potential information asymmetries which lead to problems of moral hazard.  
Using Bank Lending Survey, Maddaloni and Peydró  (2009) study the determinants of bank 
lending standards in the Euro Zone, and find that high securitization activity amplifies the 
positive impact of low short-term interest rates on bank risk-taking. Using a large data set of 
securitized subprime loans in the U.S., Keys et al.(2009) find that loans originated by banks 
tend to default more relative to independent lenders. Their conclusions are well supported by 
Purnanandam(2008) and Loutskina and Strahan ( 2008). A central question surrounding the 
current subprime crisis is whether the securitization process reduced the incentives of 
financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. Keys et al. (2010) examine this issue 
using data on securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts in the United States. Their 
findings suggest that existing securitization practices did adversely affect the screening 
incentives of subprime lenders. Although lots of empirical research shows the relationship 
between securitization and financial stability, there is little theoretical research in this area. 
We compare the securitization model to the benchmark model and test the validity findings of 
the empirical research. 
2.3 Financial leverage and financial stability 
Finally, this study is related to the extensive literature on leverage and financial systemic risk. 
Geanakoplos (1997, 2003) introduced the idea of endogenous margins or equilibrium 
leverage. Geanakoplos (2003) especially identified increasing volatility and increasing 
disagreement as causes of increased margins, and hence of the leverage cycle. Adrian and 
Shin (2008) put forward a theory of pro-cyclical leverage and credit availability based on the 
optimizing behaviour of financial intermediaries. In their model, pro-cyclical leverage comes 
from investment bank’s focus on value at risk. Adrian and Shin argued that volatility is 
countercyclical, allowing banks to take more leveraged bets when asset prices are high. 
 
Our approach is to build on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) with three key differences. 
First, we focus on asset securitization and its effect on financial leverage and systemic risk. In 
contrast, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) focus on the dynamic interaction between credit limits 
and asset prices. Focusing on securitization allows us to closely explore its impact on 
financial leverage and systemic risk. Second, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) analyse the 
economic shock on net value and asset price through linearization. In this study, we calculate 
the equilibrium and then analyse the impact on the two factors. This allows us to illustrate the 
results in a more intuitive way. Third, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct an economy with 
indefinite periods while we consider a model with just three periods, so as to make the model 
simpler as well as illustrating the impact of shock. 
 
Another closely related paper is Shleifer and Vishny (2010). They also look at banks’ 
endogenous choice of liquidity which involves fire sales of illiquid assets. However, there are 
two major differences between our model and theirs. First, while their research only 
concentrates on at the choice of the securitization, our paper combines both the choice of 
securitization and its impact on asset price. Second, Shleifer andVishny (2010) doesn’t 
consider any economic shock in the model while we introduce shock in our model to show 
the relationship between securitization, asset price and financial stability.  7 
 
3 The Benchmark Model 
We consider a model with three periods: 0(initial period), 1(intermediate period), and 2(final 
period). The economy produces two goods, consumption good and capital good. 
Consumption goods can be turned into capital goods on one for one basis at any point of time 
by the bankers, but the opposite is not feasible. There are two important assumptions. Firstly, 
we assume there are two types of players in the economy: bankers and direct lenders. They 
are risk neutral and identical within their group. Secondly, we assume the complete 
competition in the banking industry following similar practice in Allen and Gale (1998), 
Rochet andVives (2004), and Korinek (2008). Free entry into the banking industry forces 
banks to compete by offering deposit contracts that maximize the expected utility of the firms. 
Thus, the bankers in our model can also be interpreted as entrepreneurs -in a sense that they 
make financing decisions and are subject to business risk. 
 
Both the banker and direct lender can produce consume good and are indifferent to consume 
in period 0, 1, 2. At period 0, 1, 2, the respective expected utilities of a banker and a direct 
lender are  0 1 2
bbb   and  0 1 2
ccc  . There is no discounting and here is no interest 
conflict between the bank owners and the bankers. The objective functions of a banker and a 
direct lender are: 
Max  0 0 1 2 ()
bbb E    and Max  0 0 1 2 ()
ccc E          (1) 
 
3.2 Endowments and Projects 
Each banker has an endowment n of consumption goods at the beginning of his life and 
receives no further endowment in the following periods. Each direct lender receives a 
constant endowment e of consumption goods in each period.  
Each direct lender owns a firm in the ―traditional sector‖. Firms in the traditional sector 
invest capital  1
T
s k  in period 1 to produce consumption goods in period 2. The technology of 
the traditional sector is represented by the production function  1 ()
T
s Gk . The function is 
increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable and satisfies the following properties: 
(0) 0 G   , 
'(0) 1 G  . 
 
At the period t=1, there is a competitive spot market in which the consume good is exchanged 
for capital good at a price of  1s q .The other market is a one-period credit market in which one 
unit of consume good at period t=1 and t=2, is exchanged for a claim to R(R is a positive 
constant with the value no less than 1) units of consume good at period t=1 and t=2. For 
simplicity, we assume that the economy begins with no capital, so the price of capital is one 
at period 0, as long as some investment takes place.  
 
Figure 5 depicts the timeline of events. The banker has access to the following technology. In 
period 0, they choose the level of investment  0 k . In period 1, this investment yields  10 s ak 
units of consumption good, with  1 0 s a  . Without economic shock,  1s a  is a positive constant 
with a value larger than R. The economic shock,  1s a  is random and follows the normal 
distribution depends on the aggregate state s. At the end of period 1, the banker chooses the 8 
 
capital stock for next period,  1s k  , by making the net investment  10 s kk  ( 10 0 s kk   means the 
banker sell part of his capital good). The capital stock  1s k  produces A 1s k  units of 
consumption goods in period 2, with A >R> 1. Capital fully depreciates at the end of period 2. 
To maximize his consumption, the banker can lend from the direct lenders  t b  and repay R t b  
in the period t+1(t=0,1). Both the banker and the direct lender can consume all the capital or 
consume good left in period 2. Since the economy ends at period 2, so there is no debt after 
period 2. 
 
Let E( 1s a ) >R, so that early investment in period 0 is expected to be profitable. If  1s a  turns 
out to be less than 1, the bank has two options: it can either sell a portion of its capital to 
direct lenders and continue with the investment project; or it can go into liquidation, 
abandoning the project and selling all of its capital to direct lenders. 
 
Banks: 
 Endowment: Capital 
good n  
 Decision: Borrow 
0 b from the 
direct lender; 
Invest capital 




consume good e 
 Lend 
0 b  to the 
bank 
●Without shock in period 1 
Banks: 
 Product from the period 0:  0 ak  
 Repay  0 Rb  to the direct lender 
 Decision: Borrow  1 b  from the direct lender; Buy new 
capital good ( 10 kk  ) 
Direct lenders: 
 Lend  1 b  to the bank; 
 Endowment consume good e 
●With shock in period 1 
Banks: 
 Product from the period 0  10 s ak 
 Repay  0 Rb  to consumers. 
 Go to liquidation, or sell  1
T
s k  capital to the direct lender, or 
make an investment and borrow 1s b  from the direct 
lender. 
Direct lenders: 
  Lend  1s b
 to banks. If there are fire sales ( 1 0
T
s k  ), 
invest ( 1
T
s k ) in traditional sector. 
 Endowment consume good e 
 Buy asset good  1
T
s k  from the banker and invest it to the 
traditional sector. 
●Without shock in 
period 1 
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 Repay  1 Rb  to the 
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Direct lenders: 
 Consume all the 
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1(The bank survives 
from the shock in 
period 1.) 
 Repay 1s Rb  to 
consumers. 
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3.4 Equilibrium with no shock 
We now solve for equilibrium with no shock. Since direct lenders expect investment in the 
productive sector of the economy to be profitable and, since they have very large 
endowments relative to bankers, they always meet the borrowing demands of the banker. 
If the banker has capital good  t k  at t h e   b e g in n i n g   o f  t h e   p erio d ,  t h e n  h e   c a n   b o rro w   t b  in total, 
as long as the repayment does not exceed the market value of his capital goods at period 
t+1(t=0,1), i.e. 
 
00 0 b q n    and  1 1 0 0 b q k      (2) 
 
The two constraints specify that the banker can only borrow up to a fraction   of the value of 
their assets in each period, where we define   to be the maximum loan-to-value ratio as in 
Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and Gai et al. (2006). Since the economy ends at period 2, the 
banker has no incentive to borrow at period 2. 
 
The banker can expand his scale of production by investing in more capital goods. We 
consider a banker who holds endowment capital good n and has incurred a total debt  0 b . At 
the beginning of the period, he can invest  0 k  which should satisfies 
00 k n b   (3) 
At period 1 the banker harvests  0 ak  capital good, which, together with a new loan  0 b , is 
available to cover the cost of buying new capital good, and to repay the accumulated debt 
0 Rb  (which includes interest). The banker’s flow-of-funds constraint at the period 1 is thus 
1 1 0 0 0 1 () q k k Rb ak b         (4) 
For the direct lender, without buying asset good from the fire sale of the banker, the direct 
lender would choose the debt 
'
0 b  and 
'
1 b  lends to the banker to maximize the utility. 
' ' ' '
0 0 1 1 () Max e b e Rb b e Rb        i.e. 
''
01 [3 ( 1) ( 1) ] Max e R b R b       (5) 
Market equilibrium is defined as a sequence of capital good prices and allocations of capital 
good, debt, and consumption, such that the banker maximizes the expected discounted utility 
(1) subject to the borrowing constraint (2) and the flow-of-funds constraint in period 0 and 
period 1; Each direct lender maximizes the expected discounted utility (1); and the markets 
for capital good and debt clear. 
 





 In equilibrium, asset prices are characterized by the conditions
'()
T
ss q G k  ,  1 0 1 ()
T
ss k k k    
for any state s. 
From this lemma, it follows that two cases are possible in the capital market. In the first case, 
the price of capital is one, the traditional sector chooses no investment, and the 
entrepreneurial sector makes positive investment 10 0 s kk  . While in the second case, the 
price of capital 
'()
T
ss q G k   and the traditional sector chooses investment 010 s kk  . 
With these conditions, we can obtain proposition 1 which gives a characterization of optimal 
financial contracts between the banker and direct lender without economic shock. 
Proposition 1. 
In equilibrium without economic shock: 
  01 1 qq  ,  
0 bn         0 ( 1) kn         1 ( 1) bn           1 ( 1)( 1) k a n nR          
01 0
bb    
2 1 1 [( 1)( 1) ] ( 1)
b Ak b R A a n nR nR                 
The total consume of the direct lender would be  3 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
c
T e R n R n            
Proof can be found in the Appendix. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. Without 
shock in period 1, the output of period 0 is  0 ak  with certain. So the banker will borrow as 
much as possible. The banker and the direct lender reach the goal to maximize their utility. 















), and the consume of the direct lender increases with  .  
3.5 Equilibrium with shock 
In this section, we solve for the competitive equilibrium by considering the optimization 
problem of the representative banker. Under the economic shock, the representative banker’s 










00 k n b       (6) 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 () s s s s q k k Rb a k b      Vs: partial or no liquidation            (7) 11 
 
1 1 1 0
b
s s s q k Rb     Vs: total liquidation in period 1             (8) 
2 1 1
b
s s s Ak Rb   Vs: partial or no liquidation        (9) 
2 0
b
s    Vs: total liquidation in period 1           (10) 
00 0 b q n  
            (11) 
1 1 0 0 ss b q k              (12) 
 
Equation (6) represents the banker’s budget constraint in period 0: investment costs and any 
profits taken by the banker in period 0 must be financed by its endowment (initial net worth) 
and borrowing from direct lenders. In period 1, provided that the investment project 
continues (i.e. provided that the bank does not go into total liquidation), the bank’s budget 
constraint is given by (7): Financing is provided by the start of the period assets at their 
market value and net period 1 borrowing, adjusted for the revenue surplus or shortfall. In 
period 2, profits are then given by (9).  
 
By contrast, if the bank goes into total liquidation in period 1, it sells all of its capital at the 
market price, yielding  11 s qk in revenue. Therefore, its period 1 profits are given by (8), while 
period 2 profits are zero. Finally, (11) and (12) simply represent combined and simplified 
versions of the borrowing constraints. 
 
Since the expected returns on investment are always high, it is clear that the bank will never 
take any profit until period 2 unless it goes into total liquidation. Therefore,  01 0 s    for 
all state s. Moreover, given that the high return between periods 1 and 2 is certain, banks wish 
to borrow as much as possible at period 1. So (12) binds at its upper bound and  00 b q n   . 
Finally, the asset price is only endogenous in period 1:  0 1 q   because of the large supply of 
consumption goods in period 0 and no capital good sale.  
Proposition 2 shows the optimal financial contracts between the banker and the direct lender 
with economic shock in period 1. 
Proposition 2. There exists a unique symmetric competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium, asset 
prices satisfy 1 01 s q  . Depending on the shock  1s a  , the optimal debt is one of the following 
types: 
Type1:  11 ss a q R   
  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) 0 s s s s s s s s Z Z R Z a q Z R Z a q R          
Then optimum 
*
0 b =0, in this case the bank will go to bankrupt or keep insolvent by 
liquidating part of capital good. The over borrowing rate is  . 
Type2:  11 ss a q R   




00 (0, ) b q n   , in this case the bank will liquidate part of his capital good to 
keep insolvent. The over borrowing rate lies within the pale of (0, ). 
Type3:  11 ss a q R   
  01 0 s Z Z R   
Then optimum debt 
*
00 b q n   , which is similar with the equilibrium without shock 














 . The over borrowing rate is 0. 
The variables  0 Z and  1s Z  defined above, respectively, are the Lagrange multipliers on the 
budget constraints at periods 0 and 1; they represent the rates of return on bank wealth in 
periods 0 and 1.The banker must exhaust his borrowing capacity in the high state 
( 11 ss a q R  ) while must borrow nothing in the low state( 11 ss a q R  ). In the media state 
( 11 ss a q R  ), the banker is indifferent between borrow any from the direct lender. 
Obviously, in the low and media state, the banker is over borrowing (
*
0 0 0 b q n b   ). As 
1 () s E a R  , the banker in the market aiming at maximum profit will always exhaust his 
borrowing capacity.  The over borrowing rate in the low state is higher than in the media and 
high state. 
 
Then we focus on the critical point that the bank liquidates all the capital good and the asset 
price. Using the result that the financial constraint is always binding in period 2 (from 
Appendix C), we can get 
 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 () s s s s k k q b R a k b       (13) 
Let  0 1 1
T
ss k k k , we can get  










     (14) 

















     (15)    
Equation (15) shows that the more assets the banker sells, the more deeply decreasing the 
asset price will be. Figure 6 gives a graphical illustration of the equilibrium in the state of low 
and media states for given values of  0 k ,  0 b and  1s b . Curve S plots the banker’s supply of 
capital as a function of  1s q . The more the capital is sold, the further the price will decline. 13 
 
An increase in  1s b  increases the capital stock at period 0. The choice of  0 b affects the 
equilibrium price in another way. Figure 6 shows the effect of an increase in borrowing in 
period 0, leading to a rightward shift of the banker’s supply and to a lower equilibrium price. 
For completeness, the figure includes the regions where  1s qA   arise in equilibrium although 
such prices never arise in equilibrium as when  1s q  goes above A, the banker’s investment 
becomes unprofitable and will sell all the capital good  0 k .  
 
 
If the banker can’t make the repayment in period 1, then the bank will go bankrupt. There 
exist two extreme cases: 
 
Case 1: No capital good sale. In this case, there is a positive shock that allows the banker to 
make the repayment in period 1 without fire sale.  
10 0 s kk   
From lemma 1, we can clearly find that 
'
1 (0) 1 s Gq  . Let 10 s kk   and we can get the 
threshold for  1s a from (13), which can be rewritten as 
0 1 0 1 ss b R a k b     (16) 
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Figure 6 Asset market equilibrium 
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Case 2: Financial crisis. In this case, there is a negative shock that leads the representative 
banker to sell all the capital good and still can’t keep solvent. Let 1 0 s k   and we can get the 
threshold for  1s a from (13). 
0 1 0 1 0 1 s s s b R a k b k q           (17) 
Let  0 bn    and  1 1 0 ss b q k    into (17). We can get 
**
1 1 1 1





 . For  10 '( ) s q G k  , 
we can get 
** ' '
1 0 0 ( ) ( )
1






. So we can see for any 
''
1 0 0 ( ) ( )
1





 , the bank will surely go bankrupt. 
 
From figure 7, we can see clearly that the shock can directly have effect on asset price. When  
*
11 ss aa  , there will be no asset sale and  1 1 s q  . When 
**
11 ss aa  , the bank will sell all the 
capital good and 
'
10 () s q G k  . With securitization, the threshold will be smaller. But when a 
crisis happens, the loss will be larger than the situation without securitization which we will 
show in next section. 
4 The Model with Asset Securitization 
We model securitization as the sale of cash flow claims that would otherwise be held by 
banks. We do not model packaging and tranching of loans, which are based on the 
securitization and essentially a process of re-securitization.  It has similar influence on 
financial systemic risk like securitization. As in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and shleifer 
and Vishny(2010), we assume that the bank must initially keep a fraction d of the loan on its 
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Figure7 The Asset price as a function of the shock 
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own books when it sells a loan in the market. If N projects are financed and the 
corresponding loans are securitized, the bank must hold dN of these securities on its balance 
sheet at the time of the underwriting. We assume that the bank does not need to hold on to 
these securities for more than one period. 
When the bank securitizes a loan, it can sell the securities it does not retain in the market. We 
denote by  t p  (t=0, 1) as the price of the securities at time t, which is an exogenous positive 
constant (The price can deviate from the rational price of 1 because of investor sentiment, 
which is not the focus of the paper.). The banker has an incentive to securitize the capital 
good only if  10 ( ) 1 1
S
s E a p   in period 0 and  1 11 Ap   in period 1.In the case of 
identical projects, all securities are obviously identical.  
 
For the purpose to maximise his utility, the banker can securitize these loans. A suitably large 
portfolio of assets is "pooled" and transferred to a "special purpose vehicle" or "SPV" (the 
issuer), a tax-exempt company or trust formed for the specific purpose of funding the assets. 
And the SPV get them with price  t p at the beginning of period t and sell them to the buyer in 
the financial market. At the end of the period t+1, the banker should repay the buyer with the 
price of 1. 
4.1 Securitization without shock 
 Let  0
S k ,  1
S k ,  0
S b and  1
S b denote the investment and borrowing in period 0 and 1 respectively. 
The superscript ―S‖ denotes the state with securitization. As shown in section 3.5, the shock 
in the economy is 1 ()
S
s a E a R  . We assume that  0 11
S ap   and  1 11 Ap   so the 
banker has the incentive to securitize the capital good. Since the banker expects investment in 
the economy to be profitable and he will invest as much as possible. The direct lender has 
very large endowments relative to banker and he always meets the borrowing demands of the 
banker. 
 
Excepting borrowing from the direct lenders, the banker can securitize these loans and sell 




 income from the 





  in period 1. 
If at period 0 and 1 the banker has capital good  t k , then he can borrow  t b  in total, as long as 
the repayment does not exceed the market value of his capital goods and the income from 
securitization at period t+1(t=0,1), i.e., 
       
00
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
      and  1 1 0 0 1
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S S S
s b q k k p
d
      (18) 
In period 0, the banker can invest his initial wealth plus the amount borrowed from the direct 
lender and the income from securitization, 




SS k n b np
d
   
   (19) 16 
 
The banker can expand production by investing in more capital goods. Consider a banker 
who holds investment  0
S k  and has incurred a total debt  0
S b . At pe ri od 1 t he   bank  harvest s   0
SS ak 
capital good, which, together with a new loan  1
S b  and profit from 
securitization 01
11
( 1) ( 1)( 1)
SS k p a n
dd
    , is available to cover the cost of buying new 
capital good, to repay the accumulated debt  0
S Rb  (which includes interest) and the face value 
of the securitization. The banker’s flow-of-funds constraint at the period 1 is thus 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1)
S S S S S S S S k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
          
  (20) 
At the end of period 2, the banker can harvests  1






  , repay the debt  1
S bR  and the face value of securitization in 
period 1. And then he can consume all the good left, that is, 
1 1 0 0
11
( 1) ( 1)( 1)
S S S S Ak b R k A k
dd
     
   (21)
 
We can get proposition 3 by solving the problem the banker faces. 
Proposition 3. 
In equilibrium without economic shock: 
  01 1 qq  ,  
00
1
[1 ( 1) ]
S b n p
d
         
  00
1
( 1) [1 ( 1) ]
S k n p
d
       
1 1 0
11
( 1) [1 ( 1) ][1 ( 1) ]
S b n p p
dd
            
  1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
( 1)[ 1 ( 1) ][ ( 1) ] ( 1) [ ( 1) ]
S S S k a p n np a n n np R
d d d d
              
01 0
Sb Sb    17 
 
2 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 1 1
{( 1)[ 1 ( 1) ][ ( 1) ] ( 1) [ ( 1) ] }
11
[ ( 1) ]( 1)[ ( 1) ]
Sb S S S S Ak b R A a p n np a n n np R
d d d d




             
     
 
The Appendix gives the detail poof of it. Comparing the Proposition 1 with Proposition 3, we 






























S bb  ,  11 0
S bb  ,  00 0
S kk  , 11 0
S kk  , 22 0
Sb b    
Through securitization, the banker improves his borrowing ability and investment ability 
greatly. So the number of projects financed in the economy becomes larger and the balance 
sheet expands. Also, profit at the end of period 2 is higher than the case of without 
securitization under no economic shock. The bank has greatly increased its profit ability 
through securitization, which will improve the social welfare. 
4.2 Securitization with shock 
Let  0
S k ,  1
S
s k ,  0
S b and  1
S
s b denote the investment and borrowing in period 0 and 1 respectively. 
With an economic shock, we need some additional conditions. Similar to the section 4.1, we 
assume that  10 ( ) 1 1
S
s E a p   and  1 11 Ap   so the banker has the incentive to securitize 
the capital good. As in part 3.5, the shock in the economy is denoted as 1 ()
S
s E a R  . Since the 
banker expects investment in the economy to be profitable and he will invest as much as 
possible. The direct lender has very large endowments relative to banker and he always meets 
the borrowing demands of the banker. 
Excepting borrowing from the direct lenders, the banker can securitize these loans and sell 




 income from the 





  in period 1. 
If the banker has capital good 
S
t k , then he can borrow 
S
t b  in total, as long as the repayment 
does not exceed the market value of his capital goods and the income from securitization at 
period t+1(t=0,1), i.e., 
       
00
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
      and  1 1 0 0 1
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
        (22) 
In period 0, the banker can invest his initial wealth plus the amount borrowed from the direct 
lender and the income from securitization, 




SS k n b np
d
   
    (23) 18 
 
The banker can expand his scale of production by investing in more capital goods. Consider a 
banker who holds  0
S k , and has incurred a total debt of 0
S b . At period 1 the bank harvests  00
SS ak 
capital good, which, together with a new loan  1
S
s b  and profit from 
securitization 0 1 1
11
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
SS
s k p a n
dd
     , is available to cover the cost of buying new 
capital good, to repay the accumulated debt  0
S Rb  (which includes interest) and the face value 
of the securitization. The banker’s flow-of-funds constraint at the period 1 is thus 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
S S S S S S S S
s s s s s k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
           
   (24) 
At the end of period 2, the banker can harvests  1
S
s Ak  capital good get the profit from 
securitization  0
1
( 1) ( 1)
S Ak
d
   , repay the debt  1
S
s bR  and the face value of securitization in 
period 1. And then he can consume all the good left, that is, 
1 1 0 0
11
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
S S S S
ss Ak b R k A k
dd
      
    (25) 
Proposition 4 shows the optimal financial contracts between the banker and the direct lender 
with economic shock and securitization. 
Proposition 4
 
Depending the shock of  1s a , there exist three cases: 
Case1:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS
s Z Z R   
Then optimum
*
0 0 b  , in this case the bank will go bankrupt or liquidate part of the capital 
good to keep insolvency. The over borrowing rate is  0
1
[1 ( 1) ] p
d
  . 
Case2:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS






(0, [ ( 1) ]) b n np
d
    , in this case the bank will liquidate part of his capital 
good. The over borrowing rate lies in (0, 0
1
[1 ( 1) ] p
d
  ). 
Case3:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS
s Z Z R   
Then optimum  10
1
[ ( 1) ]
S
s b n np
d
   
. The over borrowing rate is 0. 
Where 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
11
( 2)( 1) ( 1)
S S S S S
s s s s s Z A Z a Z p Z q
dd









We can see clearly that the over borrowing rates in the low and media economic shock states 
decrease withd . Comparing to Proposition 2, we can obtain that the over borrowing rates 
with securitization in the low and media economic shock states is larger than the situation 
without securitization.  
 
Then we focus on the critical point that the banker keeps solvency or liquidates all the capital 
good and the asset price. Using the result that the financial constraint is always binding in 
period 2 (from Appendix C), we can get 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
S S S S S S S S
s s s s s k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
           
   (26)
.  
If the banker can’t make the repayment in period 1, then the bank will go bankrupt. There 
exist two extreme cases: 
Case 1: No capital good sale. In this case, there is a positive shock that make the banker can 
make the repayment in period 1 without fire sale.  
10 0 s kk   
From lemma 1, we can clearly find that 
'
1 (0) 1 s Gq  . Let 10
SS
s kk   and we can get the 
threshold for  1
S
s a from (24), which can be rewritten as 









b R n b k p a n
d d d a
k
        
   (27) 
Let  00
1
[ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
     and  1 1 0 0 1
1
[ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
   






1 1 ( 1)[1 ( 1) ]
S






    
   




ss aa  , there 
will be no fire sale. 20 
 
Case 2: The banker liquidates all the good. In this case, there is a negative shock that leads 
the bank to sell all the capital good and still can’t keep solvent. Let 1 0
S
s k   and we can get the 
threshold for  1s a from (26). 





( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)




b R n b k p a n k q
d d d a
k
         
    (28) 
Let  00
1
[ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d




ss b q k k p
d
   






1 1 ( 1)[1 ( 1) ]
S






    
   
. For  10 '( )
S





'( ) ( 1) '( )
1 1 ( 1)[1 ( 1) ]
S S S






    
   




ss aa  , the bank will surely go bankrupt. 








ss aa  . When the banker liquidates all the capital good, the price will decline more than 
the situation without securitization  (
''
00 ( ) ( )
S G k G k  ). We can watch directly from figure 7. 
Since  1s a follows normal distribution, we can obtain that 
** **
1 1 1 1 ( ) ( )
S
s s s s P a a P a a     which 
shows that securitization decrease the probability that banks go to liquidation. 
5 Welfare Analysis 
Let us next investigate the behaviour of a social planner who optimizes the banker' 
allocations. The social planner's objective is the same as that of the banker. However, 
whereas decentralized bankers take asset prices  1s q as given, the social planner internalizes 
that the valuation of assets declines the more she sells.  
This changes the social planner's first-order condition on land  0
SP k and  1
SP
s k  to 
   FOC( 0
SP k ):   1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0
11
( 1) ( 1) ( ) 0
SP SP SP SP SP SP SP s
s s s s s s s SP
q
A Z Z a Z p Z q Z k k
d d k

        

 
   FOC( 1
SP
s k ):  
1
1 1 1 1 0
1
( ) 0
SP SP SP SP s
s s s s SP
s
q
A Z q Z k k
k

   

 
For  0 0
SP k   and  1 0
SP
s k  , we can get 
1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0
11
( 1) ( 1) ( ) 0
SP SP SP SP SP SP SP s
s s s s s s s SP
q
A Z Z a Z p Z q Z k k
d d k






1 1 1 1 0
1
( ) 0
SP SP SP SP s
s s s s SP
s
q
A Z q Z k k
k

   

 
As long as  10 0
SP SP












The planner's first-order condition coincides with that of the banker. However, when there is 
capital good sale in period 1, then the social planner's valuation of liquidity becomes 
1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0
11
( 1) ( 1) ( )
SP SP SP SP SP SP SP s
s s s s s s s SP
q
Z A Z a Z p Z q Z k k
d d k

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.The asset price  1s q  declines the more of the asset is sold from 
bankers to direct lender (i.e. the smaller  1s k  ). And we can get  00
SP S ZZ   and  11
SP S
ss ZZ  . We 
can summarize the result in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 
When facing financing constraints, the social planner values liquidity more since he 
internalizes that higher liquidity would reduce the quantity of resales required and would 
therefore mitigate the decline in asset price and the tightness of economy-wide financing 
constraints. 
 
Proposition 5 shows that: When financing constraints are binding, a decline in asset prices 
hurts all bankers since it reduces the amount of liquidity that they can raise from the sale of 
each unit of assets. Bankers take asset prices as given since they realize that their individual 
behaviour has only an infinitesimal effect on asset prices. However, the behaviour of all 
bankers together can lead to large fluctuations in asset prices. 
 
The externality in our setup stems from the failure of decentralized bankers to internalize the 
effects of their risk-taking decisions on asset prices and by implication the effects on the 
financial constraints faced by other bankers. First-best policy measures against the described 
systemic externalities would attempt to break the feedback cycle underlying the financial 
amplification effects. Financial regulators should induce market participants to take 
precautions against some of the risk they are holding on their balance sheets and limit the 




Prior to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the general view regarding securitisation is that it 
reduces credit risk and enhances the resilience of the financial system in dealing with defaults. 
Attention has been paid on distorted incentives developed at all stages of the securitisation 
process which expands the balance sheet and over-borrowing.  
In this paper we analyse the effects of securitization on the risk of default of a representative 
bank. Our model shows that banks can increase its profitability considerably through 
securitization if there is no shock or a positive shock. At the same time securitization 
decreases the probability that systemic crisis happen. But by securitization, bankers take on 
too much risk in both their financing and investment decisions; more generally they over-
borrow and over-invest, which will suffer more loss when systemic crisis happen. 
This paper demonstrate the effect that securitization has on the financial stability using a 
relatively simple three period model. Our model lays a theoretical foundation for the 
empirical research. Moreover, by extending the model to social welfare analysis, we illustrate 
the implication for the regulatory direction of securitization. Given the connection between 
securitization and systemic risk and systemic externalities, this model can be utilised by 





A. Proof of lemma 1 
The consumer chooses 
T
s k to maximize expected utility, that is Max[ ()
TT
s s s G k q k  ]. For G( )is 
a strictly concave function with 
'(0) 1 G  . Therefore, if  1 s q  , opti mal  i nves t ment i s  
T
s k =0, 
while if  1 s q  , 
T
s k  is positive and satisfies the first-order condition 
'()
T
ss q G k  . 
 
B. Proof of Proposition 1 
For the banker, consider the problem of maximizing consumption subject to (A1.1)–(A1.4) 
and non-negativity constraints for  0 k  and  1 k . 
11 () Max Ak b R   
s.t.    00 k n b    (A1.1) 
       1 0 1 0 0 1 () k k q b R ak b            (A1.2) 
And   00 0 b q n      (A1.3) 
          1 1 0 0 b q k      (A1.4) 
Let  0 Z  and  1 Z  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (A1.1) and (A1.2).  
The Lagrange equation would be: 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ( ) [ ( ) ] 0 L Ak b R Z n b k Z ak b b R k k q             
An optimum is characterized by the following first-order conditions: 




Z Z a Z q
k

    

 with strictly equation if 0 0 k  .And we can obtain that 
















  , so 
0 1 1 ( ) 1 Z Z a q    . For both  0 Z  and  1 Z  are strictly positive, the constraint (A1.1) and 
(A1.2)are binding.  

















, we can find: 
if  010 Z Z R  , then  0 b =0, 24 
 
if  010 Z Z R  , then  00 (0, ) b q n   , 
if  010 Z Z R  , then  00 b q n   , 
and 
if  1 0 ZR , then  1 0 b  , 
if  1 0 ZR  , then  1 1 0 (0, ) b q k   , 
if  1 0 ZR  , then  1 1 0 b q k   . 
From Assumption A> a>R, we can get that  0 1 1 1 () Z Z a q Z R    , and  010 Z Z R  , 






   , we can get  0 1 0 b q k   . 
For the direct lender, with no buying asset good from the fire sale of the banker, the direct 
lender would choose the debt 
'
0 b  and 
'
1 b  lends to the banker to maximize the utility. 
' ' ' '
0 0 1 1 () Max e b e Rb b e Rb        i.e. 
''
01 [3 ( 1) ( 1) ] Max e R b R b      
For R>1, we can find that the more the direct lender lend, the more his utility would be, with 
the debit market clear condition 
'
00 bb   and 
'
11 bb  . 
For  01 1 qq  , in equilibrium, 
0 bn         0 ( 1) kn         1 ( 1) bn           1 ( 1)( 1) k a n nR          
2 1 1 [( 1)( 1) ] ( 1)
b Ak b R A a n nR nR                 
C. Proof of Proposition 2 
Similarly with the proof of proposition 2, for the banker, consider the problem of maximizing 
(A2.1)subject to (A2.2)–( A2.5) and non-negativity constraints for  0 k  and  1 k . 
11 () ss Max Ak b R    (A2.1) 
s.t.   00 k n b   (A2.2) 
       1 0 1 0 0 1 () s s s k k q b R ak b            (A2.3) 
And   00 0 b q n       (A2.4) 25 
 
          1 1 0 0 ss b q k       (A2.5) 
Let  0 Z  and  1s Z  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (A2.2) and (A2.3).  
The Lagrange equation would be: 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ( ) [ ( ) ] 0 s s s s s s s L Ak b R Z n b k Z a k b b R k k q             
An optimum is characterized by the following first-order conditions: 
0 1 1 1 1
0
]0 s s s s
L
Z Z a Z q
k

    

 with strictly equation  if 0 0 k  .And we can obtain that 


















  , so 
0 1 1 1 ( ) 1 s s s Z Z a q    . For both  0 Z  and  1s Z  are strictly positive, the constraint (A2.2) and 
(A2.3) are binding.  




















, we can find: 
if  01 0 s Z Z R  , then  0 b =0, 
if  01 0 s Z Z R  , then  00 (0, ) b q n   , 
if  01 0 s Z Z R  , then  00 b q n   , 
and 
if  1 0 s ZR  , then  1 0 s b  , 
if  1 0 s ZR , then  1 1 0 (0, ) ss b q k   , 
if  1 0 s ZR , then  1 1 0 ss b q k   . 
From Assumption A>R, we can get  1s ZR  , so  11 ss b q n   . 
For the direct lender, with no buying asset good from the fire sale of the banker, the direct 
lender would choose the debt 
'
0 b  and 
'
1 b  lends to the banker to maximize the utility. 
' ' ' '
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ) )
TT
s s s Max e b e Rb b e Rb G k q k          i.e. 
''
0 1 1 1 1 [3 ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ]
TT
s s s Max e R b R b G k q k        26 
 
For R>1, we can find that the more the direct lender lend, the more his utility would be, with 
the debit market clear condition 
'
00 bb   and 
'




ss q G k  ,  1 0 1 ()
T
ss k k k   . 
Depending the shock of ( 11 ss aq  ), there exist three cases: 
Case1:  11 ss a q R   
  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) 0 s s s s s s s s Z Z R Z a q Z R Z a q R          
Then optimum  0 b =0, in this case the bank will go to bankrupt. 
Case2:  11 ss a q R   
  01 0 s Z Z R   
Then optimum  00 (0, ) b q n   , in this case the bank will liquidate part of his capital good. 
Case3:  11 ss a q R   
  01 0 s Z Z R   
Then optimum debt  00 b q n   , which is simsssilar with the equilibrium without shock in 
section 3.4. 
D. Proof of Proposition 3 
1 1 0 0
11
[ ( 1) ( 1)( 1) ]
S S S S Max Ak b R k A k
dd
           (A3.1) 
s.t.   0 0 0
1
( 1)
SS k n b np
d
      (A3.2)      
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1)
S S S S S S S S k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
                  (A3.3) 
And   00
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
        (A3.4) 
          1 1 0 0 1
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S S S
s b q k k p
d
        (A3.5) 
Let  0
S Z  and  1
S Z  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (A3.2) and 
(A3.2).  The Lagrange equation would be: 27 
 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1
( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( ( 1) )
1 1 1
[ ( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( ) ( 1) ] 0
S S S S S S S
S S S S S S S S S
L Ak b R k A k Z n b np k
d d d
Z a k b k p a n k k q b R n
d d d
            
           
 
 
An optimum is characterized by the following first-order conditions: 
0 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1
( 1) 2( 1) ( 1) 0
S S S S S
S
L
A Z Z a Z p Z q
k d d d

         

 with strictly equation if 0 0
S k  . 
Since  0 0
S k  , we can get  0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( 1) 2( 1) ( 1) 0
S S S S S A Z Z a Z p Z q
d d d
         . So 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( 1) 2( 1) ( 1)
S S S S S Z A Z a Z p Z q
d d d












 with strictly equation if 1 0







  , so 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( 1) 2( 1) ( 1) 1
S S S S S S Z A Z a Z p Z q Z
d d d





















, we can find: 
if 010
SS Z Z R  , then  0
S b =0, 
if 01 0
SS Z Z R  , then  00
1
(0, [ ( 1) ])
S b n np
d
    , 
if 01 0
SS Z Z R  , then  00
1
[ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
    , 
and 
if  1 0
S ZR , then  1 0
S b  , 
if 1 0
S ZR  , then  1 1 0 0 1
1
(0, [ ( 1) ])
S S S b q k k p
d
    , 
if 1 0
S ZR  , then  1 1 0 0 1
1
[ ( 1) ]
S S S b q k k p
d








and  01 0
SS ZZ  , we can obtain that  1 1 0 0 1
1
( 1)
S S S b q k k p
d
     and  
00
1
[ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
    . 28 
 
For both  0
S Z  and  1
S Z  are strictly positive, the constraint (A3.2) and (A3.3) are binding. 
We can get  0 0 0 0
11
( 1) ( 1)[ ( 1) ]
SS k n b np n np
dd
        
 and 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1)
S S S S S S S S k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
          




( 1) [1 ( 1) ][1 ( 1) ]
S b n p p
dd




[1 ( 1) ]
S b n p
d
   
, we can 
rewrite it as 
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
( 1)[ 1 ( 1) ][ ( 1) ] ( 1) [ ( 1) ]
S S S k a p n np a n n np R
d d d d
            
 
Then we can get the utility of the banker in the period 2: 
2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
( 1) ( 1)( 1) {( 1)[ 1 ( 1) ][ ( 1) ] ( 1) [ ( 1) ] }
11
[ ( 1) ]( 1)[ ( 1) ]
b S S S S S S Ak b R k A k A a p n np a n n np R
d d d d d d




                  
     
 
E. Proof of Proposition 4 
1 1 0 0
11
[ ( 1) ( 1)( 1) ]
S S S S
ss Max Ak b R k A k
dd
         (A4.1) 
s.t.   0 0 0
1
( 1)
SS k n b np
d
      (A4.2) 
       1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
S S S S S S S S
s s s s s k k q b R n a k b k p a n
d d d
                   (A4.3) 
And   00
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
       (A4.4) 
          1 1 0 0 1
1
0 [ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
       (A4.5) 
Since A>1, we can get ( 1) 1 AA     . 
Let  0
S Z  and  1
S
s Z  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to (A4.2) and 
(A4.3).  The Lagrange equation would be: 29 
 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1
( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( ( 1) )
1 1 1
[ ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ] 0
S S S S S S S
ss
S S S S S S S S S
s s s s s s
L Ak b R k A k Z n b np k
d d d
Z a k b k p a n k k q b R n
d d d

            
           
 
 
An optimum is characterized by the following first-order conditions: 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
11
( 2)( 1) ( 1) 0
S S S S
s s s s s S
L
A Z Z a Z p Z q
k d d

        

 with strictly equation if 0 0
S k  . 
Since  0 0
S k  , we can get  0 1 1 1 1 1 1
11
( 2)( 1) ( 1) 0
S S S S
s s s s s A Z Z a Z p Z q
dd
        . So 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
11
( 2)( 1) ( 1)
S S S S
s s s s s Z A Z a Z p Z q
dd













 with strictly equation if 1 0
S









  , so 
0 1 1 1 ( ) 1
S S S
s s s Z Z a q    . For both 0
S Z  and  1
S
s Z  are strictly positive, the constraint (A4.2) and 






















, we can find: 
if  01 0
SS
s Z Z R  , then  0
S b =0, 
if  01 0
SS
s Z Z R  , then  00
1
(0, [ ( 1) ])
S b n np
d
    , 
if  01 0
SS
s Z Z R  , then  00
1
[ ( 1) ]
S b n np
d
    , 
and 
if  1 0
S
s ZR  , then  1 0
S
s b  , 
if  1 0
S
s ZR , then  1 1 0 0 1
1
(0, [ ( 1) ])
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
    , 
if  1 0
S
s ZR , then  1 1 0 0 1
1
[ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d









 , we can obtain that  1 1 0 0 1
1
[ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
    . 
Depending the shock of ( 11
S
ss aq  ), there exist three cases: 30 
 
Case1:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS
s Z Z R   
Then optimum
*
0 0 b  , in this case the bank will go bankrupt or liquidate part of the capital 
good to keep insolvency. 
Case2:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS





(0, [ ( 1) ]) b n np
d
    , in this case the bank will liquidate part of his capital 
good. 
Case3:  1 1 1 1
1
11





A p Z a q R
d q d
          
  01 0
SS
s Z Z R   
Then optimum  1 1 0 0 1
1
[ ( 1) ]
S S S
ss b q k k p
d
    . 
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